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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of the car scrapping subsidies in Europe during the nancial
crisis. We make use of a rich data set of all car models sold in nine European countries,
observed at a monthly level during 2005-2011. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences ap-
proach, exploiting the fact that di¤erent countries adopted their programs at di¤erent
points in time. We nd that the scrapping schemes played a strong role in stabilizing
total car sales in 2009: they prevented a total car sales reduction of 17.4% in coun-
tries with schemes targeted to low emission vehicles, and they prevented a 14.8% sales
reduction in countries with non-targeted schemes. In contrast, the scrapping schemes
only had small environmental benets: without the schemes, average fuel consumption
of new purchased cars would have been only 1.3% higher in countries with targeted
schemes and 0.5% higher in countries with non-targeted schemes. We do not nd evi-
dence of crowding out due to substitution from non-eligible to eligible cars in countries
with targeted schemes. Finally, we identify some competitive and trade e¤ects from
the schemes: domestic car producers beneted at the expense of foreign competitors
in the countries where the schemes were not targeted.
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1 Introduction
The European automotive sector has been particularly and signicantly a¤ected by the most
recent nancial turmoil and the severe economic downturn. The sector has been hit by a
sharp and uniform drop in demand for passenger cars. From 2000 until the rst half of 2008,
new passenger car registrations in Western Europe ranged from 14.2 to 14.8 million units on
a yearly basis. In the second half of 2008 car registrations dropped dramatically, which led
to a number of temporary plant closures and layo¤s, and to a low rate of capacity utilization.
While car registrations temporarily stabilized at 13.7 million units in 2009, they dropped
further to 13.0 million units in 2010.1 At the same time, many automotive companies have
reported problems with access to credit nancing, in particular in getting loans on reasonable
terms.
In response to the nancial and economic crisis, many European countries have intro-
duced scrapping programs to foster car purchases, and thus cushion the impact of the sharp
downturn on their domestic car production industry (see e.g. Car Communication (2009)2,
IHS Global Insight (2010a), IHS Global Insight (2010b), ACEA (2010) for an overview). The
schemes were most active in 2009, and they were also introduced in other parts of the world,
e.g. the US Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) of 2009 or so called Cash for Clunkers
Program, or Japanese Eco-Friendly Vehicle Purchase Program of 2009.
The concept of car scrapping schemes is simple: vehicle owners receive state money to
trade in their old vehicles for new, usually more fuel-e¢ cient ones. The schemesunderly-
ing rationale is also straightforward: for countries with signicant car production, a fall in
demand for vehicles would raise the risk of bankruptcies and unemployment, thereby trigger-
ing severe consequences for workers in the car industry and for the industrys suppliers and
distributors. Hence, for the major car-producing countries, the scrapping programs serve to
promote car purchases to adjust strong pro-cyclical demand behaviour, and consequently to
save production and jobs.
However, scrapping schemes are not new for the past crisis. They have also been widely
used before the crisis, mainly aimed to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) and other emissions
by taking older, more polluting cars o¤ the road, or to improve road safety by reducing the
age of the car eet on the roads and by selling new cars with better equipment (such as
ABS, ESC, airbags and navigation systems). These environmental motives can especially be
strong in the countries that have little or no domestic car production.
1The gures are based on the statistics for new car registrations in Western Europe, published by the
European Automobile ManufacturersAssociation (ACEA) in its EU Economic Report in July 2011.
2Commission Communication Responding to the Crisis in the European Automotive Industry
COM(2009) 104 (Car Communicationthereafter).
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In this paper we study the impact of the scrapping schemes that were adopted during
the recent economic crisis. Our rst main question deals with the incentive e¤ects of the
scrapping schemes. To which extent did the schemes stimulate total demand for cars, or
at least did they serve to temporarily stabilize demand? And to which extent did the
scrapping schemes also yield environmental benets in the form of fuel economy savings
on new purchased vehicles? Our second question is whether there were any crowding-out
e¤ects of the scrapping schemes, such as substitution from non-eligible to eligible cars, or
intertemporal substitution? Our third question is whether the scrapping schemes resulted in
competitive and trade e¤ects: Did domestic rms benet more than their foreign competitors,
and did volume brands and small cars win at the expense of premium brands and large cars?
To address these questions we collected a unique dataset that enables us to combine
the specic features of the European scrapping schemes with detailed data on car sales and
product characteristics. We use monthly data for the period 2005-2011, and focus on nine
European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries make up for 90% of the car sales in the
European Union. To estimate the impact of the scrapping schemes we follow a di¤erence-
in-di¤erences approach, exploiting the fact that the specic timing of the scrapping schemes
di¤ered between countries. We distinguish between targeted and non-targeted schemes.
Targeted schemes provide a subsidy if the new car satises certain environmental eligibility
criteria (mainly based on CO2 emissions), and were adopted in for example France and Italy.
Non-targeted schemes provide a subsidy regardless of the new car that is purchased. These
were introduced in for example Germany and the United Kingdom.
Our empirical ndings can be summarized as follows. First, scrapping schemes had a
strong stabilizing impact on total car sales, especially in countries with targeted schemes: if
there had been no schemes in 2009, total sales would have been 17.4% lower in the countries
with targeted schemes, and they would have been 14.8% lower in countries with non-targeted
schemes. In elasticity terms: a 1% point subsidy tends to raise car sales by 1.4% for cars
under non-targeted schemes, and by 2.8% for eligible cars under targeted schemes. At the
same time, the scrapping schemes only had a small e¤ect on the average fuel consumption of
new purchased cars: without the schemes, average fuel consumption would have been 1.3%
higher in countries with targeted schemes and 0.5% higher in countries with non-targeted
schemes. That is, the main e¤ect of European scrapping schemes in the nancial crisis was
to temporarily stabilize total car sales, and their environmental benets were very limited.
Second, there were only limited crowding out e¤ects. In the case of targeted schemes, the
sales of non-eligible cars were not a¤ected during the period when the scheme is e¤ective.
Furthermore, intertemporal substitution e¤ects were small. Third, the scrapping schemes
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had various competitive and trade e¤ects. Quite surprisingly, domestic car brands beneted
more than foreign car brands from scrapping subsidies when the programs were non-targeted
(as in Germany and the UK), but not when the programs were targeted (as in France
and Italy). Premium brands gain less from subsidies than volume brands but only in the
case of targeted schemes. Small cars (from the subcompact and compact segments) benet
under both targeted and non-targeted schemes, whereas large cars (from the standard and
luxury market segments) only benet under targeted schemes (i.e. when they meet the
environmental eligibility criteria). The schemes may eventually impact trade ows as, for
instance, they may increase imports to satisfy the increased domestic demand for cars, not
produced locally.
Our study is timely for two major reasons: (i) most empirical work on the incentive e¤ects
of scrapping schemes has focused on non-crisis times, and has not compared the e¤ects on
total car sales with the environmental benets; (ii) no work has considered the competitive
and trade e¤ects. We discuss both contributions in turn.
First, despite a number of theoretical and policy studies related to scrapping subsidies,3
there are just a few studies that empirically investigate the economic e¤ects of scrapping
schemes. Some authors apply a dynamic structural framework that enables them to di¤er-
entiate between the short-term and long-term e¤ects of scrapping schemes on sales of new
cars and to analyze the e¤ects of schemes on the used car market, for instance Adda and
Cooper (2000) for French scrapping subsidies between 1994 and 1996, or Schiraldi (2011)
for Italian scrapping subsidies in 1997 and 1998.4 While these papers focus on scrapping
schemes in non-crisis times, only a few studies estimated the car demand e¤ects of schemes
during the last nancial and economic crisis. Mian and Su(2012) and Li et al. (2013) apply
a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to quantify the sales e¤ects of the US CARS program:
Mian and Su (2012) use variation across the US cities in ex-ante exposure to the program
(based on the number of available clunkers), while Li et al. (2013) choose Canada as a control
group for identication. These US studies nd positive short-term e¤ects of the program on
car sales, but this e¤ect erodes if a longer time horizon is considered.5
3Theoretical papers on the design of cash-for-scrappage subsidies are, for instance, Hahn (1995), Al-
berini et al. (1995), Esteban (2007). Policy papers include the automotive consultancy IHS Global Insight
(IHS Global Insight (2010a), IHS Global Insight (2010b)), which has analysed economic, environmental
and road safety e¤ects of European scrapping schemes introduced in response to the last nancial and eco-
nomic crisis in the study for the European Commission. Several other policy studies concentrate on the
environmental or safety impacts of scrapping schemes (e.g. OECD (1999), OECD/ITF (2011)).
4The authors nd that the scrapping policies stimulate car sales in the short run, followed by a sales
contraction in the long run. Licandro and Sampayo (2005), using a hazard function approach and ignoring
the second-hand market, nd a high positive e¤ect of 1997 Spanish scrapping subsidy on sales in the short
run, but small in the long run.
5Cooper et al. (2010) and Copeland and Kahn (2012) estimate a time-series forecasting model to predict
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With our study, we aim to contribute to this empirical literature on the economic e¤ects of
scrapping programs, using a panel data approach and exploiting country-by-country program
variation to identify the impact of scrapping policies (i.e. a country di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach). For this purpose, we exploit a unique monthly car model-level dataset, enriched
with detailed data on the timing and design of the scrapping schemes, for a rich sample of
nine European countries. This enables us to systematically compare the total sales e¤ects
with the environmental benets of the di¤erent types of schemes. Our study also ts well
into the more general empirical literature related to the ex post evaluation of competition
policy, applied in the context of scrapping incentives in our paper.6
Second, apart from the total sales e¤ects of scrapping programs and their impact on
the demand for fuel-e¢ cient cars, we study their competitive and trade e¤ects in the light
of the European Commissions policy towards scrapping subsidies. There is no notication
requirement for state aid and no formal assessment of scrapping schemes by the European
Commission, although the Commission recognizes their possible adverse e¤ects on com-
petition and trade.7 In particular, the Commission requires that scrapping schemes are
non-discriminatory with respect to the origin of a car. That is, the schemes should avoid
favouring only the sale of vehicles of domestic manufacturers by including, for instance, car
characteristics, which could discriminate against similar cars coming from other member
states. Moreover, the schemes should be compatible with other parts of Community legis-
lation, in particular concerning type-approval of vehicles (Euro IV emission limit values).
Therefore, there is a notication requirement for the conditions of schemes related to the
technical characteristics of cars at draft stage. The Commission has the right to issue com-
ments on the technical specications where the scal or nancial incentives can potentially
hinder trade in the internal market. However, no o¢ cial decision of the Commission is yet
published.
counterfactual sales. Busse et al. (2012) study the price e¤ects of the US CARS Program and nd evidence
for considerable consumer benets due to three reasons: 1) consumers beneted fully from the scrapping
rebates, 2) consumers gained even more since the program stimulated car producers to increase their own
rebates, 3) the program had little e¤ect on the prices in the used car market. Since we only observe list prices
and not transaction prices, we cannot unfortunately quantify the price (pass-through) e¤ects of scrapping
subsidies.
6The di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach has become a standard method in the ex post evaluation of com-
petition policy. Compared to most ex post merger studies (for instance, Ashenfelter et al. (2009), Ashenfelter
and Hosken (2010), Weinberg (2011)), we use a country di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach rather than choose
a control product group (i.e. products not a¤ected by the merger) in the same geographic market for iden-
tication. Only a few studies rely on another geographic market as a control group (for instance, Hosken et
al. (2011)). Several papers use the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach also to investigate the impact of cash
promotions, e.g. Busse et al. (2006) in the context of auto manufacturer promotions.
7The Car Communication - Annex 3, Guidance on Scrapping Schemes for Vehicles, summarizes the
policy of the European Commission towards scrapping schemes.
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Empirical evidence on the competitive and trade e¤ects of schemes is very scarce. For
instance, IHS Global Insight (2010a) discuss the market structure e¤ects of crisisscrapping
schemes and argue that market segments, including medium and large cars as well as pre-
mium and luxury vehicles, only marginally beneted from the schemes. OECD (1999) also
report higher benets of scrapping schemes for the producers of small cars at the expense
of large cars. Li et al. (2013) argue that Japanese car producers Toyota, Honda and Nissan
beneted much more from the targeted US CARS Program than other rms. Overall, the
program has not however led to any signicant shifts in market shares among car producers.
As there is hardly any comprehensive analysis of competitive and trade e¤ects of schemes in
the existing empirical studies, we aim to ll in this gap in the literature. Generally, our rich
empirical evaluation of scrapping subsidiese¤ects follows the structure of economic com-
patibility assessment by the European Commission in the case of state aid (that balances its
positive and negative e¤ects) that we implement in the context of scrapping incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the design
and economic assessment of scrapping schemes related to our sample of European countries.
Section 3 presents our empirical approach to the analysis of scrapping schemes. We rst
describe the data, and then depict our identication and estimation strategy. In Section 4
we discuss our empirical ndings. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
2 Design and economic assessment of scrapping schemes
2.1 Denition and design of scrapping schemes
Many European countries have introduced large-scale scrapping programs as an economic
stimulus to increase market demand for the car sector during the last nancial and economic
crisis.8 Scrapping schemes have been formulated in a variety of ways. Most of them are
designed to take old (polluting) cars o¤ the road and to replace them typically with new, or
younger (more fuel-e¢ cient) models. Such schemes are called cash-for-replacement.9 Only
a few schemes in Europe are designed as cash-for-scrappage, i.e. there is no condition on the
age of a replacement car or obligation to purchase a replacement car at all.10 For instance,
the Greek scheme of 2009 was not conditioned on the purchase of a new car. Generally,
8In our discussions we focus on nine European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, for which we do our empirical analysis. Only Belgium
has not adopted any scrapping scheme at all.
9The 2009 US Cash for ClunkersProgram falls under this type of scrapping incentives.
10OECD (1999) introduces this distinction between cash-for-replacementand cash-for-scrappagesub-
sidies.
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scrapping schemes put di¤erent conditions on the duration of the program, the size of the
incentive, the form of the incentive (tax rebates, price discounts, etc.), the age of an old
vehicle that can be scrapped, and the conditions on a new vehicle that can be purchased.
We discuss these features in more detail below.
Duration First, scrapping schemes di¤er in their duration, as shown in Figure 1. Some
countries introduce schemes that run for several years (e.g. Portugal), whereas other schemes
have a short duration to temporarily stimulate demand (as, for instance, during the most
recent economic crisis in Germany, the United Kingdom, etc.). Some countries phase out
their scrapping schemes gradually (e.g. in France that gradually reduced the incentive size
from EUR 1,000 in 2009 to EUR 750 in the rst half of 2010 and to EUR 500 in the second
half of 2010), while other countries end them abruptly (e.g. in Germany).
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Figure 1: Timing of scrapping schemes in selected European countries
The gure depicts scrapping schemes in nine European countries based on IHS Global Insight, ACEA
and various national sources. The o¢ cial duration of a scheme is given (i.e. not taking into account
the extended period for registration, usually up to three months). Red color means that a scheme
is targeted. Green color means that a scheme is non-targeted.
Size Furthermore, the scrapping schemes di¤er in their intensity as reected by the size of
incentive and overall government budget available for a scheme, and subsequently, the max-
imum number of cars that can be purchased under the scheme (see Table 1). In 2009 the
scrapping subsidies varied from EUR 1,000 (e.g. in France) to EUR 2,500 (in Germany).11
Incentives are usually nanced by the government (either central or local), but car manu-
facturers may commit themselves to contribute to the incentive as well (e.g. 50:50 incentive
in the United Kingdom). The German Government introduced the most generous scrapping
program in 2009 (with an overall budget of EUR 5 billion).12
11The choice of optimal incentive size is far from obvious. For instance, Esteban (2007) argues that a
subsidy lower than the price of a used car in the absence of subsidy can still induce scrappage. Alberini et
al. (1995) argue that at low o¤er prices, vehicles that are in the poorest conditions, with relatively short
remaining life are likely to be scrapped. At higher o¤er prices, vehicles in a better condition, with longer
expected lives will be attracted under the scheme.
12Usually scrapping schemes foresee a xed budget and state the nal date of a scheme, or specify that
the scheme ends as soon as the budget expires. In the case of the former condition, there might be a spyke
in sales in the last month(s) of the scheme. In the case of the latter condition, the program may have a
stronger e¤ect on sales at the beginning (Li et al. (2013)).
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Table 1: Design features of scrapping schemes in selected European countries
Duration Incentive Old car age Conditions on a car purchase
France
5 Dec 2007-3 Dec 2008 EUR 300 >15 years new, max 160 g/km CO2
4 Dec 2008-31 Dec 2009 EUR 1,000 >10 years new, max 160 g/km CO2
1 Jan 2010-30 June 2010 EUR 750 >10 years new, max 155 g/km CO2
1 July 2010-31 Dec 2010 EUR 500 >10 years new, max 155 g/km CO2
1 Jan 2011-31 Dec 2011 EUR 300 >15 years new, max 150 g/km CO2
Germany
14 Jan 2009-31 Dec 2009 EUR 2,500 >9 years new, min Euro 4,
or used, max 1 year old
Greece
28 Sep 2009-2 Nov 2009 EUR 500-2,200 >13 years without purchase of new car
EUR 1,500-3,200 >13 years Euro 4 or 5, with purchase of new car,
incentive depending on engine displacement
Italy
3 Oct 2006-31 Dec 2007 EUR 1,316 >9 years new, Euro 4&5, up to 100 kw,
max 140 g/km CO2 (petrol),
or max 130 g/km CO2 (diesel)
EUR 1,574 >9 years new, Euro 4&5, more than 100 kw,
max 140 g/km CO2 (petrol),
or max 130 g/km CO2 (diesel)
1 Jan 2008-31 Dec 2008 EUR 800 >9 years new, max 130 g/km CO2
EUR 900 >9 years new, max 120 g/km CO2
7 Febr 2009-31 Dec 2009 EUR 1,500 >9 years new, min Euro 4+
max 140 g/km CO2 (petrol),
or max 130 g/km CO2 (diesel),
additional incentives of up to EUR 3500 for
hybrid, all-electric or gas-powered new vehicles
Netherlands
29 May 2009-21 Apr 2010 EUR 750-1,000 >13 years petrol (incentive depending on age)
EUR 1,000-1,750 >9 years diesel (incentive depending on age),
new car/van equipped with particular lter,
new car< 8 years
Portugal
1 Jan 2005-31 Dec 2005 EUR 1,000 >10 years new
1 Jan 2006-31 Dec 2008 EUR 1,000 >10 years new
EUR 1,250 >15 years new
1 Jan 2009-7 Aug 2009 EUR 1,000 >10 years new, max 140 g/km CO2
EUR 1,250 >15 years new, max 140 g/km CO2
8 Aug 2009-31 Dec 2009 EUR 1,250 >8 years new, max 140 g/km CO2
EUR 1,500 >13 years new, max 140 g/km CO2
1 Jan 2010-31 Dec 2010 EUR 1,000 >10 years new, max 130 g/km CO2
EUR 1,250 >15 years new, max 130 g/km CO2
Spain
11 Apr 1997-31 Dec 2006 EUR 480 >10 years new, or used (up to 5 years old)
1 Jan 2007-31 Dec 2007 EUR 480 >10 years new, max 2500 cc,
or used (up to 5 years old)
4 Sept 2008-15 May 2009 EUR 2,000 >10 years new, max 120 g/km CO2,
max new vehicle price EUR 30 000,
>15 years or used (up to 5 years old)
18 May 2009-31 Dec 2009 EUR 2,000 >10 years new, max 120 g/km CO2,
max new vehicle price EUR 30 000,
>12 years or used (up to 5 years old)
1 Jan 2010-30 Sept 2010 EUR 2,000 >10 years new, max 120 g/km CO2,
max new vehicle price EUR 30 000,
>12 years or used (up to 5 years old)
UK
18 May 2009-31 Mar 2010 GBP 2,000 >10 years new
The table summarizes scrapping schemes in nine European countries based on IHS Global Insight, ACEA and
various national sources. We describe the characteristics of schemes that are the most relevant for our empirical
analysis and that are related to passenger cars only. Spanish (2008-2010) and British scrapping incentives
include a mandatory incentive on the part of car manufacturers. The o¢ cial duration of a scheme is given (i.e.
not taking into account the extended period for registration, usually up to three months).
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Targeted versus non-targeted The scrapping schemes di¤er in their eligibility criteria.
We will distinguish between targeted schemes (red/dark shading in Figure 1) and non-
targeted schemes (green/light shading). Targeted schemes put conditions on a new vehicle
that can be purchased, in terms of maximum CO2 emissions, engine displacement, or price.
For instance, in France cars with CO2 emissions that do not exceed 160 grams per kilometer
were eligible for the scrapping program in 2009. Conversely, non-targeted schemes apply
widely to virtually all cars in the country. For instance, in Germany the condition on new cars
is rather lax: eligible vehicles have to meet Euro 4 emission standards, which is automatically
satised for all cars since the European Commission introduced these standards in 2005.
Under some schemes, an old car may be purchased as a replacement car as well (e.g. up to
one year old in Germany, or up to eight years old in the Netherlands).
Age The e¤ectiveness of schemes in stimulating car purchases may also di¤er depending
on conditions put on the age of a vehicle that can be scrapped (i.e. only vehicles older than a
certain age are eligible for the scheme) and, consequently, the age of the existing car eet and
its vintage distribution in a country.13 The lowest minimum age requirement for scrapped
cars is 8 years (in Portugal). The highest age requirement is 15 years (e.g. in France in 2008
and in 2011). A higher age threshold for a scrapped car may narrow the base for the scheme
and lower its overall success measured by the number of vehicles sold all other things being
equal.14 On the other hand, it may ensure that the most polluting cars are scrapped and
thus render higher environmental benets.15
Complexity In general, some European countries have introduced simple transparent
scrapping schemes. For instance, in Germany there was one incentive of EUR 2,500 for
any type of new car purchased in the form of price discount, which might be clear and
appealing to consumers. On the other hand, other countries have approved more complex
schemes with a system of subsidies depending on the type of vehicle. For instance, Greek
scrapping scheme had a number of conditions that determined the size of incentive (e.g. from
EUR 1,500 up to EUR 3,200 for cars) depending on engine displacement, which eventually
13For instance, Adda and Cooper (2000) emphasize that the cross sectional distribution of car vintage
determines the initial e¤ects of scrapping policies, in particular the fraction of cars older than a (new)
optimal scrapping age. The changes in the distribution of car ages, induced by the policies, reduce the car
production considerably in the future periods.
14Schiraldi (2011) nds that reducing an age of a scrapped car from 10 to 8 years increases the e¤ect of
scrapping schemes on sales.
15Alberini et al. (1995) for example argue that since older vehicles have a less sophisticated pollution-
control requirement, a policy directed at scrapping older model vehicles may reduce total emissions. There
is however uncertaintly as for how e¤ective the schemes are in reducing emissions.
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might make the program less comprehensive to consumers (who cannot correctly assess the
associated benets) and, therefore, might limit the schemes success. Past Spanish scrap-
ping schemes are also perceived to be unsuccessful due to their complex implementation that
required the involvement of banks and nance companies (ACEA (2010)).
2.2 Economic assessment of scrapping schemes
Our empirical evaluation of scrapping subsidies largely follows the structure of the ex ante
economic compatibility assessment of state aid by the European Commission. This assess-
ment is essentially about striking a balance between the benets and costs of state aid (the
so called balancing test) that we apply to the ex post assessment of scrapping incentives.16
Incentive e¤ects: demand and environmental e¤ects Scrapping schemes have a
general objective of stimulating demand of vehicles to support the automobile industry,
especially in the crisis that was accompanied by the worsening of condence and degradation
of householdsaccess to nance. Around 60-80% of new European private car purchases are
nanced through some form of credit (IHS Global Insight (2009)).
Since scrapping schemes aim at removing ine¢ cient, high polluting vehicles from circula-
tion and stimulating purchases of more fuel-e¢ cient cars, they have an e¢ ciency objective,
in particular with regard to the over-provision of a negative externality such as pollution.
The schemes may also be aimed to improve road safety, thus generating a positive external-
ity. However, the environmental and road safety benets of scrapping schemes are somewhat
questionable in practice.17
Following these demand and environmental motives to introduce scrapping programs, we
can assess their benets, and especially evaluate whether total new car sales and average fuel
e¢ ciency of new cars would have been lower absent the schemes, i.e. we can quantify the
incentive e¤ects. The di¤erence in total car sales and average fuel economy with scrapping
incentives (actual) and without scrapping incentives (counterfactual) can be viewed as the
incentive impact of the scrapping subsidies. Since the actual outcomes are usually observed,
a major challenge in practice is to estimate the counterfactual outcomes.
Crowding out e¤ects: temporal and intertemporal substitution Two major types
of crowding out e¤ects are relevant in the case of scrapping schemes: temporal substitution,
16See, for instance, Grigolon et al. (2012) for the presentation of this economic framework in general and
its discussion as related to scrapping schemes.
17See, for instance, OECD (1999), Sinn (2009), IHS Global Insight (2010a), OECD/ITF (2011), Li et al.
(2013), Li and Wei (2013) for related evidence and detailed discussion.
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i.e. substitution between cars, and intertemporal substitution.18
As related to the substitution between cars, rst of all there may be a substitution from
non-eligible cars to eligible ones in the case of targeted schemes. That is, during the program
period, the sales of eligible cars may go up, whereas the sales of non-eligible cars may go
down. For instance, Copeland and Kahn (2012), Li et al. (2013) report that during the US
CARS Program some consumers that would have purchased a car that is not eligible for a
scheme have bought a car eligible for the scheme attracted by the availability of a rebate.
Finally, there may be a substitution e¤ect between di¤erent types of cars, for example from
large to small cars under any type of scheme.
As related to the intertemporal substitution, rst an anticipatory e¤ect arises when a
consumer correctly anticipates the introduction of a scrapping program and delays the pur-
chase of a vehicle that he would have bought anyway. Thus, one can observe a reduction
in sales before a scheme starts. Second, scrapping schemes can induce a pull-forward e¤ect,
which arises when a scrapping incentive induces sales of vehicles that would otherwise have
occurred in the near future: i.e. car sales today at the expense of car sales in the future
(European Commission (2009), Cooper et al. (2010)). A consequence of this e¤ect is that
following the expiry of schemes, there is a sharp decrease in sales. The exact timing (a few
weeks, a few months or longer), or the dynamic pattern of this e¤ect is di¢ cult to estimate.
Competitive and trade e¤ects Scrapping schemes can cause distortions of competition
and trade. First, scrapping schemes can favour car producers that manufacture small sized
cars that happen to comply with environmental conditions linked to the incentives or that
become more appealing to consumers because the size of incentive makes smaller and cheaper
cars more attractive. Consequently, the schemes may distort the market structure in terms
of redistributing the market shares of di¤erent rms or across di¤erent market segments.
In such a way, some weaker players in the European car industry may be supported (IHS
Global Insight (2010a)).
Furthermore, scrapping schemes can impact trade ows and distort location decisions.
In particular, scrapping schemes can only be attractive for certain models of a car producer.
Thus, scrapping programs may result in an uneven plant utilization: some plants may be
obliged to allocate workers on short-time working schemes, while other plants may have use
overtime to meet the increased demand or shift labour force from one plant to another, as
18Scrapping schemes can crowd out demand for other durable goods, for example, used cars (Schiraldi
(2011)). Busse et al. (2012) point out another type of crowding out e¤ect. In particular, they investigate
whether government scrapping rebates may crowd out manufacturer rebates in the case of the US CARS
Program and nd that the program has in fact stimulated manufacturer rebates. The evaluation of these
e¤ects are beyond the scope of this paper.
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reported by Eurofound (2010) and by carmakers themselves.19
Finally, if scrapping schemes are de facto selective, they can cause subsidy competitions
among countries, where each country designs environmental conditions linked to the incen-
tives (e.g. in terms of CO2 emissions) to favour domestic producers with respect to foreign
ones. Several European countries have imposed environmental requirements on new cars
that can be purchased under their schemes. For instance, in France a car is qualied for a
scrapping bonus if it emits less than 160 grams CO2 emissions per kilometer (in 2009), or in
Italy a new petrol car should emit at most 140 grams CO2 emissions per kilometer (or 130
grams CO2 emissions per kilometer in case a diesel car is bought). Similar environmental
conditions were set for schemes in Portugal and Spain.
Summary In this paper we aim to investigate the e¤ects of scrapping schemes on total
car sales and average fuel economy (Incentive e¤ects), explore temporal and intertemporal
substitution e¤ects (Crowding out e¤ects), quantify the competitive e¤ects of schemes
and discuss their trade implications (Competitive and trade e¤ects). We especially pay
attention to the role of environmental technical eligibility criteria (such as CO2 emissions,
or fuel consumption) for a new car that can be purchased under a scrapping program,
and analyze whether the criteria contradict the objective of non-discriminatory nature of
scrapping schemes with respect to the origin of a car producer.
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Data description
Our rst dataset is a European car registration dataset from JATO. It covers nine countries:
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom. Taken together, these countries make up more than 90% of the EU car market.
The dataset covers the period between 2005 and 2011. The data are at a high frequency,
at a monthly level, and at a very disaggregate level: the individual car model and car
variant (engine type, body style, etc.). These data include monthly car registrations, list
prices and technical specications (horsepower, various measures of fuel consumption, fuel
type, length, width, height, weight, body style, etc.). Although we focus on the e¤ect of the
scrapping schemes on car registrations, the information on prices and technical specications
is indirectly also very useful: it enables us to determine which cars are eligible in a targeted
19See for instance, http://www.atgroupreport.com/2009/bilancio.php?lang=en
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scrapping scheme and to measure the (relative) size of the scrapping incentive. Finally, there
is information on the cars brand, its country of origin, and the rm ownership.
We slightly aggregate the data and dene the unit of our analysis as the combination
of model group, body and fuel type, for example the Volkswagen Golf, hatchback, diesel
engine. This detailed level enables us to account for various eligibility criteria in the case of
targeted schemes, in particular also criteria that are linked to CO2 emissions and gasoline
versus diesel car engines (as in the Netherlands or Italy).
Our second dataset consists of information on the European scrapping programs. For
each country and each month, we know whether a scrapping scheme was active. In the case
of targeted schemes, we also know which eligibility criteria applied (as summarized above in
Table 1). We have collected this information from various sources. First of all, the automotive
consultancy IHS Global Insight summarizes scrapping schemes for the EU member states in
its report to the European Commission, with a specic focus on the schemes introduced in
response to the last nancial and economic crisis (IHS Global Insight (2010a), IHS Global
Insight (2010b)). In addition, the European Automobile ManufacturersAssociation (ACEA)
gives an overview of scrapping schemes introduced in the EU countries in 2009 and 2010
(ACEA (2010)). We have cross-checked both major sources of information on scrapping
programs with national legislation and government sources for verication and collected
missing pieces of information necessary for our empirical analysis.
We combine the car registration data with the information on the European scrapping
schemes. We thus obtain a very detailed picture on the scrapping scheme conditions of every
car model/fuel engine, in each of the nine countries during each month between 2005 and
2011. More specically, for every model/engine, country and period, we construct a dummy
variable indicating whether the model/engine is eligible for a car scrapping scheme. In the
case of targeted schemes, this depends on CO2 emissions criteria, engine displacement, the
price or other criteria. Furthermore, we construct a variable for the size of the incentive
(which may also depend on the criteria in the case of targeted schemes) and some additional
information, such as the minimum age of a car that can be scrapped (country/month specic
information).
We set the duration of a scrapping scheme to be equal to its o¢ cial duration according
to a respective regulation or legislative act. We also allow for an extended period to register
a car as part of our sensitivity analysis. The extended period usually takes up to three
months after the o¢ cial expiry date of schemes and captures the time gap between sale and
registration of a car.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in 2009 (when all countries
in our sample, except for Belgium, introduced scrapping programs, although during di¤erent
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months). We distinguish between countries with targeted schemes (left hand side) and
countries with non-targeted schemes (right hand side). In the case of targeted schemes,
we also distinguish between eligible cars and non-eligible cars. For targeted schemes, the
eligible cars form a minority (9,764 model observations versus 15,656 observations for the
non-eligible models), but they have on average much higher sales (400 versus 58 cars). The
eligible cars also tend to be sold at a much lower price (average of EUR 19,400 versus EUR
44,700 for the non-eligible models), and, by construction, they are much more fuel-e¢ cient.
For countries with non-targeted schemes, the summary statistics typically fall in between
these extremes. For example, the average price in countries with non-targeted schemes is
EUR 34,813. The average relative incentives are 8.3% for eligible cars in the case of targeted
schemes and 6.0% across all cars in the case of non-targeted schemes.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for European scrapping schemes (2009)
Targeted schemes Non-targeted schemes
Eligible cars Non-eligible cars All cars
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Sales (units) 400.2 905.8 58.4 146.8 245.0 799.7
Price (EUR 1,000) 19.4 8.1 44.7 44.5 34.8 38.9
CO2 emissions (gram=km) 129.1 15.0 200.5 58.4 180.6 60.2
Fuel consumption (litre=100 km) 5.12 0.71 8.12 2.56 7.35 2.62
Horsepower (kW ) 71.4 21.5 134.8 71.3 116.1 68.8
Width (cm) 173.0 8.28 182.0 7.05 179.2 8.65
Length (cm) 410.4 43.1 457.3 30.3 443.2 41.6
Height (cm) 150.3 7.3 154.2 16.0 153.1 13.8
Domestic cars (0-1) 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.34
Premium cars (0-1) 0.13 0.34 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39
Scrapping dummy (0-1) 1 0 0 0 0.63 0.48
Relative incentive (%) 8.27 4.44 0 0 5.95 6.69
# months 12 12 12
# models 405 731 844
# countries 4 4 4
# observations 9,764 15,656 25,395
The table reports means and standard deviations for our main variables in the case of targeted (left hand side)
and non-targeted (right hand side) schemes in 2009. In the case of targeted schemes we distinguish between
eligible and non-eligible cars. Countries with targeted schemes include France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Countries with non-targeted schemes include Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Belgium does not have any scrapping scheme, so it is not presented in the table. The variables are expressed as
averages per model. Prices are retail prices (i.e. after VAT and other taxes).
14
Figure 2 (see Appendix) depicts the evolution of seasonally adjusted monthly car sales in
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These were the countries that
introduced the scrapping programs for the rst time between 2005 and 2011, in response to
the nancial crisis. In all countries sales declined in the second half of 2008 in response to
the worsening nancial and macroeconomic conditions. The scrapping programs could have
helped to stabilize the car sales and prevented them from a sharper decline. Especially the
German scrapping scheme seems to have caused a spike in the car sales during the treatment
period of scrapping subsidy, followed by a noticeable decline afterward. In general, however,
it is di¢ cult to draw clear conclusions from the Figure, since there are many factors that
may have a¤ected sales before and after the treatment period. Our empirical framework
below aims to disentangle the various e¤ects and obtain conclusive evidence on the e¤ects
of programs.
We have extended our European car scrapping database with macroeconomic data on
European countries in our sample: GDP per capita (Eurostat, quarterly), unemployment
rate (Eurostat, monthly), consumer condence index (OECD, monthly), price of fuel/diesel
(OECD, quarterly) and total number of passenger cars in use, or number of passenger cars
in use more than 10 years old (Eurostat, yearly).
3.2 Identication and estimation strategy
To identify the e¤ects of the car scrapping subsidies, we employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach. The idea is to compare the change in sales in the treatment countries, where
the scrapping policies took place during certain time periods, with the change in sales in
the control countries, where the scrapping policies did not take place (e.g. Belgium), or
took place during di¤erent time periods. Our identication strategy thus exploits a unique
feature of the European scrapping programs, i.e. that they were implemented at di¤erent
time intervals during the 2005-2011 period, as shown earlier in Figure 1. We can follow this
approach because we have detailed information on sales by car model for many European
countries at a high, monthly frequency.
A simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach would consider one treatment and one control
group, and only two time periods. The identifying assumption in such a setting is that
the treatment and control groups follow the same trend in the absence of the treatment
(scrapping program). We can extend this assumption to multiple countries and multiple
time periods. We will control for macro-economic variables that may evolve di¤erently across
countries, such as monthly GDP and fuel prices. We will also control for other policies that
were implemented during the period: the green incentives implemented in Belgium during
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2008-2011 (eco-incentivesin the form of price reductions of up to 15%) and France during
2008-2011 (bonus-malusin the form of a staggered tax rebate of up to EUR 5,000 for cars
with low CO2 emissions and an extra charge of up to EUR 2,600 for cars with high CO2
emissions).
Since we observe the sales and car specications at the level of individual car models, we
can further enrich the framework in various ways. First, we can account for the size of the
scrapping policy incentive, which may di¤er depending on the car specications. Second,
we can account for various possible crowding out e¤ects of the scrapping schemes. In the
case of targeted scrapping schemes, we can assess the di¤erential e¤ects on the eligible cars
(usually with low CO2 emissions) and non-eligible cars (with high CO2 emissions). We can
also assess the intertemporal e¤ects: anticipatory and pull-forward e¤ects. Third, we can
consider the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes on competition and trade. Perhaps the most
relevant question from a European policy perspective is whether domestic brands benet
more from scrapping subsidies than foreign brands. We can also compare di¤erent e¤ects
between volume and premium brands, or across market segments.
Incentive e¤ects With multiple countries and time periods, one can implement the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach using a panel xed e¤ects estimator. We include a full
set of model/country xed e¤ects, and monthly time xed e¤ects, as well as various con-
trol variables that may vary over models/countries/time periods. One may start from the
following basic specication, which focuses entirely on the incentive e¤ects of the scrapping
subsidies:
log(salesjct) = jc + t +  scrapjct
+xjct + wct + "jct; (1)
where j is the car model (i.e. model group/body type/fuel type, as dened above), c is
the country, and t is time period (month during 2005-2011). The dependent variable is the
logarithm of sales of a model in a country during a certain month. The rst three terms on
the right hand side are the essential parts of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. First, jc
consists of a full set of model/country xed e¤ects, controlling for time-invariant di¤erences
in demand across models and countries. Second, t captures time xed e¤ects for every
month during the period 2005-2011. These account for general macro-economic shocks that
a¤ect European car sales. Third, our main variable of interest is scrapjct, which measures
the scrapping policy for a model, country and time period. The variable scrapjct is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the scrapping policy is active and if the car model is eligible (in the case
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of a targeted scheme), and equal to 0 otherwise. As an alternative to scrapjct, we also use the
variable scrap_pctjct, which is the percentage monetary incentive (subsidy as a percentage
of the cars list price) if the scrapping policy is active, and 0 otherwise:
log(salesjct) = jc + t +  scrap_pctjct
+xjct + wct + "jct: (2)
This takes into account the fact that size of the schemes may di¤er across models, and vary
across countries and time periods.
The parameter  measures how sales change after the scrapping policy in the treatment
country, compared with the change in sales in the control countries. When we use the dummy
variable scrapjct,  is the percentage sales increase, regardless of the size of the scheme. When
we instead use the percentage monetary incentive variable scrap_pctjct,  is the elasticity of
the incentive, i.e. the percentage sales increase when the monetary incentive increases by 1
percent.
The other terms in (1) and in (2) control for other, model- and/or country-specic factors
that may vary over time. The vector xjct includes car characteristics that may vary over
time and between countries (horsepower, displacement, fuel economy, width and height).
The vector wct includes various country-specic macro-economic variables that may vary
over time, namely income per capita, unemployment, a consumer condence index and
fuel prices. It also includes country specic seasonal e¤ects (monthly dummy variables per
country). Finally, "jct is an error term. We account for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation, and use clustered standard errors as emphasized by Bertrand et al. (2004) in the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences context.
We now extend this basic framework to account for various possible crowding out as well
as competitive and trade e¤ects.
Crowding out e¤ects Specications (1) and (2) do not distinguish between targeted
and non-targeted schemes. The treatment group thus includes all cars in countries where
non-targeted schemes are active, and it includes all eligible cars in countries with targeted
schemes. The control group includes all cars in countries where no scheme is active, but it
also includes the non-eligible cars in countries where a targeted scheme is active (see Table
2). This specication may be restrictive for targeted schemes if there are substitution e¤ects:
it is possible that the eligible cars gain proportionately more, and that the non-eligible cars
actually lose sales (rather than being una¤ected). To allow for the possible di¤erential impact
17
of targeted and non-targeted schemes, we extend (1) to the following specication:
log(salesjct) = jc + t + 1 scrapjct NTct + 2 scrapjct  Tct
+3(1  scrapjct) Tct + xjct + wct + "jct: (3)
The variable NTct is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country c at time period t adopted a
non-targeted scheme, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable Tct is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if country c at time period t adopted a targeted scheme. The parameter 1 then measures
the sales e¤ect of a non-targeted scrapping scheme on all cars in the country. Similarly, 2
measures the sales e¤ect of a targeted scheme on the eligible cars (which satisfy the CO2
or other stipulated criteria). Finally, 3 measures the sales e¤ect of a targeted scheme on
the non-eligible cars (which do not satisfy the eligibility criteria). One may expect that
2 > 1 > 0 1 3, i.e. eligible cars benet more under targeted than all cars under non-
targeted schemes, and non-eligible cars under targeted schemes lose if there is a substitution
e¤ect to eligible cars.
Specication (3) is based on the dummy variable scrapjct, which considers the e¤ect of
the scrapping scheme regardless of the size of the incentive. We also consider a specication
that is based on the percentage monetary incentive variable scrap_pctjct:
log(salesjct) = jc + t + 1 scrap_pctjct NTct + 2 scrap_pctjct  Tct
+3(1  scrapjct) Tct + xjct + wct + "jct: (4)
This specication takes into account the size of the monetary incentive. We consider (3)
and (4) as our base specications: they account for the incentive e¤ects of the scrapping
schemes (1 and 2) and a main potential crowding out e¤ect under targeted schemes: the
between-car substitution e¤ect from non-eligible to eligible cars (3).
The between-car substitution e¤ect is a crowding out e¤ect that may happen during the
scheme. We also extend (3) and (4) to consider intertemporal crowding out e¤ects, which
may occur before or after the scheme. First, we consider before-subsidy anticipatory e¤ects.
If the scheme is announced some time before it comes into force, consumers may delay their
car purchases to benet from the program. One may then observe a drop in car sales before
the program. To consider this e¤ect, we include a dummy variable in (3) and (4) for the
rst month of the scheme (when it may not yet have been e¤ective).20
20It is argued that no e¤ect should be expected beyond one month (Copeland and Kahn (2012)), or at
most two months (Li et al. (2013)) before a scheme is launched, especially in response to the crisis. Some
authors believe that no anticipatory e¤ect might be expected at all (for instance, Cooper et al. (2010) in the
case of the US CARS Program).
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Second, we consider post-subsidy pull-forward e¤ects. Consumers may decide to purchase
a car during the scheme for a planned purchase after the scheme. Consequently, following
the expiry of schemes, the car sales may go down. To investigate this e¤ect, we introduce a
dummy variable for the rst three months after a scheme expires. Note that the post-scheme
e¤ect may also capture the extended period for car registrations, during which the sales
e¤ect due to the scrapping subsidies may still be high.21
Competitive and trade e¤ects Specications (3) and (4) assume the e¤ects of the
scrapping schemes are homogeneous across car models. In practice, the scrapping schemes
may have di¤erential e¤ects, so that some cars obtain a competitive advantage. We focus here
on the possible di¤erential e¤ects between domestic and foreign cars, but in our empirical
analysis we also consider the di¤erential e¤ects between volume and premium brands, and
between di¤erent car segments. We limit attention to the specication that is based on the
percentage monetary incentive. To di¤erentiate between the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes
on the sales of domestic and foreign cars, we consider the following generalization of (4):
log(salesjct) = jc + t + 1 scrap_pctjct NTct + 2 scrap_pctjct  Tct
+1D scrap_pctjct NTct DOMjct + 2D scrap_pctjct  Tct DOMjct
+3(1  scrapjct) Tct + 3D(1  scrapjct) Tct DOMjct
+xjct + wct + "jct; (5)
where DOMjct is a dummy variable equal to one if a car model j is produced by a domestic
car producer in country c at period t. We dene the models domestic/foreign status based
on the parent rms nationality. Models sold under the brand of Citroën, Peugeot and
Renault are dened as French cars, even though their production can take place in di¤erent
locations. Similarly, Audi, BMW, Ford, Mercedes, Opel, Porsche and Volkswagen are dened
as German brands. Alfa Romeo, Ferrari, Fiat and Lancia are Italian brands. Seat is a Spanish
brand, and Jaguar, Land Rover, Mini and Vauxhall are British brands. Belgium, Greece,
the Netherlands and Portugal do not have any domestic car brands. The interaction terms
between the scrapping variables and the domestic rm dummy variable have parameters
1D, 2D and 3D. These capture the additional e¤ect of the scrapping program if the car is
of domestic origin: 1D refers to the additional sales e¤ect for domestic cars under a non-
targeted program; 2D refers to the additional sales e¤ect for domestic cars that are eligible
21The length of the pull-forward e¤ects investigated in the existing studies seems to be driven by the data
availability. For instance, in the case of the US CARS Program Li et al. (2013), Copeland and Kahn (2012)
dene 4 months as a relevant post-subsidy period, whereas Mian and Su (2012) conclude that car sales
might be pulled forward by 7 to 10 months.
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under a targeted program; and 3D measures the additional sales e¤ect (if any) for domestic
cars that are not eligible under a targeted program.
We also use a variant of specication (5), to see whether there are di¤erent e¤ects of
the scrapping programs on volume and premium car brands. Premium brands include cars
produced by Audi, BMW, Mercedes, and some small luxury brands. Finally, we investigate
whether the e¤ects of scrapping schemes di¤er across market segments. This will allow us to
infer about the e¤ect of schemes on the purchases of small, usually more fuel-e¢ cient, and
large, usually less fuel-e¢ cient, cars.
4 Empirical ndings
We now present our empirical ndings on the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes. We begin
with the basic framework where we consider the incentive and crowding out e¤ects. We then
extend the analysis to consider competitive and trade e¤ects, i.e. di¤erential e¤ects of the
scrapping schemes across di¤erent models.
Incentive and crowding out e¤ects Table 3 reports the results. Columns (1) and (4)
are based on specications (1) and (2). These assume that the scrapping schemes have the
same e¤ect on all cars, without distinguishing between targeted and non-targeted schemes.
Column (1) is based on the dummy variable scrapjct, so it measures the e¤ect of the scrapping
scheme regardless of the size of the incentive. This shows that the sales e¤ect of scrapping
schemes is positive and statistically signicant: the coe¢ cient of 0.114 implies that sales go
up on average by 12.1% due to the scheme.22 Column (4) is based on the percentage subsidy
variable scrap_pctjct, so it considers the e¤ect of a percentage scrapping subsidy. The e¤ect
of a percentage increase in the scrapping subsidy is also positive and statistically signicant:
a 1% increase in the scrapping subsidy raises car sales by 1.8%.
Columns (2) and (5) are based on specications (3) and (4). These take into account that
the scrapping schemes have a di¤erential e¤ect for targeted and non-targeted schemes, and
also consider the crowding out e¤ect on non-eligible cars in the case of targeted schemes.
Column (2), based on the dummy variable scrapjct, shows that the average e¤ect of scrapping
schemes on sales is large when the schemes are targeted, i.e. a coe¢ cient of 0.260 or an
average 29.7% increase in the sales of eligible cars. The cars not eligible for purchase under
targeted schemes do not su¤er from the scrapping subsidies (i.e. no crowding out). Column
(5), which is based on the percentage subsidy variable, yields positive sales e¤ects in the
case of both types of schemes. The e¤ect of the percentage subsidy is however stronger
22This is calculated as 1-exp(0.114)) since a semilog sales model is estimated.
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under targeted than under non-targeted schemes: a 1% increase in the subsidy raises sales
of targeted cars by 2.8% whereas under non-targeted schemes a 1% increase in the subsidy
raises sales of all cars by 1.4%. As before, we do not nd any signicant crowding out e¤ect.
Table 3: Incentive and crowding out e¤ects of scrapping schemes
Scrapping dummy Relative incentive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
scrap 0.114 1.834
(8.164) (12.070)
scrapNT 0.017 0.021 1.368 1.416
(1.273) (1.490) (8.666) (8.801)
scrap T 0.260 0.266 2.789 2.886
(13.334) (13.211) (10.712) (10.639)
(1  scrap) T -0.006 -0.005 0.007 0.009
(-0.411) (-0.337) (0.449) (0.532)
scrap - rst month -0.117 -0.152
(-9.425) (-12.681)
scrapNT - 3 months after -0.052 -0.034
(-3.255) (-2.097)
scrap T - 3 months after 0.158 0.161
(5.229) (5.154)
(1  scrap) T - 3 months after -0.072 -0.070
(-2.968) (-2.868)
# months (t) 84 84 84 84 84 84
# models 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
# countries 9 9 9 9 9 9
# groups (model/country e¤ects jc) 8,761 8,761 8,761 8,761 8,761 8,761
# observations 383,566 383,566 383,566 383,566 383,566 383,566
R-squared 0.263 0.265 0.265 0.268 0.269 0.269
The table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis). Column (1) refers to specication
(1), columns (2) and (3) refer to specication (3); column (4) refers to specication (2), and columns (5) and
(6) refer to specication (4). The dependent variable is the logarithm of car model sales. Car characteristics,
country-specic model, country-specic monthly (for seasonal adjustment), and year-monthly xed e¤ects as
well as macroeconomic controls (income per capita, unemployment, consumer condence, and fuel prices) and
dummies (or respectively, relative size) for green rebates in Belgium and France are included but not reported.
means that we use either a dummy for scrapping policy in the left hand side of the table (specications (1)
and (3)), or a percentage monetary incentive in the right hand side of the table (specications (2) and (4)).
The results in columns (2) and (5) thus show that the targeted programs do not cause any
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crowding out because of a substitution e¤ect: they do not tend to increase sales of eligible
cars at the expense of the sales of non-eligible cars. The substitution e¤ect is a crowding out
e¤ect during the scheme. We now extend the analysis to account for possible intertemporal
crowding out e¤ects.
We investigate two types of intertemporal e¤ects: anticipatory (before-subsidy) and pull-
forward (after-subsidy). To estimate possible anticipatory e¤ects of the scrapping schemes,
we include a dummy for the rst month of the scheme. To estimate whether there are any
pull-forward e¤ects of the scrapping schemes we include a dummy for three months after
a scheme expires. We do not di¤erentiate the anticipatory e¤ect between targeted and
non-targeted schemes as well as between eligible and non-eligible cars. Specic details of
schemes are not known a priori, so that a consumer most plausibly does not know which
type of a car is exactly eligible for a scheme before the scheme is actually approved, and the
o¢ cial decision is published and the scheme comes into e¤ect. However, we di¤erentiate the
pull-forward e¤ects between targeted and non-targeted schemes, and in the case of targeted
schemes between eligible and non-eligible cars.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 show the results. The scrapping e¤ects during the
scheme change only slightly compared with the previous specications that do not include
anticipatory and pull-forward e¤ects. As related to the anticipatory e¤ects, the e¤ect of the
dummy variable for the rst month of the scheme is negative and signicant. This shows
that the rst month of the scheme is not yet part of the treatment period of the scrapping
scheme, which stems from the lag between car purchase orders and car registrations. Hence,
there is a negative anticipatory e¤ect, but the e¤ect is only one month, and its magnitude
is relatively small, equivalent to about one third of the monthly e¤ect during the scheme.
As related to the pull-forward e¤ects, the e¤ect of post-subsidy dummy variable is nega-
tive and statistically signicant in the case of non-targeted schemes and for non-eligible cars
in the case of targeted schemes. The e¤ect on the sales of eligible cars in the case of targeted
schemes is positive and statistically signicant, which might be explained by the extended
period for car registrations. In this case, although the schemes expire, their positive e¤ect
can be felt over a longer period of time. Note that we do not observe any post-subsidy
period in the case of French targeted scheme. The longer than three monthspost-scheme
period may also be contaminated by other inuences (see for instance Mian and Su (2012)
for related discussion).
We have performed some counterfactuals to quantify the impact of scrapping schemes on
total car sales and average fuel economy of new cars (see Table 4). We nd that European
car sales (in countries with scrapping policies) would have been 15.9% lower in 2009 absent
the schemes. The sales would have been 17.4% lower in countries with targeted schemes
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(and 21.1% for the eligible cars). Sales would have been 14.8% lower in countries with
non-targeted schemes. Although scrapping policies thus stabilized sales in all countries,
their individual performance varies. For instance, in Germany, with its non-targeted scheme,
around 640 thousand cars (or 17.6% of total German car sales in 2009) would not have
been purchased without the scheme. In Germany, around 1.6 million cars were sold with a
scrapping incentive. That is, 40.8% of cars purchased with a scrapping subsidy, were such
that otherwise would not have been purchased. In France, with a targeted scheme, 15.9% of
cars would not have been purchased absent the subsidy in 2009.
We have also investigated how the schemes a¤ected the sales-weighted average fuel con-
sumption of new cars. We nd a benecial but small environmental impact because con-
sumers substitute to more fuel e¢ cient cars in response to the schemes. In countries with
non-targeted schemes, average fuel consumption would have been only 0.5% higher in the
absence of the schemes; in countries with targeted schemes that were explicitly targeted to
low emission vehicles, average fuel consumption would have been 1.3% higher without the
schemes, which is still only a modest e¤ect compared with the large total sales impact of the
schemes.23 The e¤ects are also quite heterogenous across countries. The targeted scheme
improved average fuel economy by up 2.3% in Spain. In contrast, the targeted scheme in
France improved average fuel economy by 0.6%, which is the same as in Germany which had
a non-targeted scheme.
23The improvement in average fuel economy of 1.3% is entirely due to a relative demand increase for the
eligible cars, which have lower fuel consumption than the non-eligible cars. The sales-weighted average fuel
economy change of eligible cars is negligible (0.07%), which shows there was indeed very limited substitution
within the group of eligible cars.
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Table 4: Impact of removing scrapping schemes on total sales and fuel consumption (2009)
Total car sales Average fuel consumption
Country actual (million) % change actual (liter/100 km) % change
Non-targeted schemes
Germany 3.63  17.64 5.99 0.56
Greece 0.21  0.93 6.43 0.07
Netherlands 0.42  4.40 5.89 0.29
UK 1.96  13.28 5.81 0.60
Total non-targeted 6.22  14.80 5.95 0.54
Targeted schemes
France 2.19  15.94 5.09 0.59
Italy 1.66  18.07 5.43 1.75
Portugal 0.16  12.35 5.20 0.62
Spain 0.95  20.29 5.49 2.30
Total targeted 4.96  17.37 5.28 1.25
eligible cars 4.05  21.14 4.97 0.07
non-eligible cars 0.91  0.69 6.67 0.00
Total (excl. Belgium) 11.18  15.94 5.65 0.92
The table reports the actual total sales and average fuel consumption as well as the estimated changes in these
variables due to scrapping schemes based on the counterfactuals for specication (4). The left hand side of the
table presents the ndings for total car sales, while the right hand side of the table reports the ndings for
(sales-weighted) average fuel consumption. Countries with non-targeted schemes include Germany, Greece, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, whereas countries with targeted schemes include France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain.
To sum up, we nd a considerable impact of the scrapping schemes on total car sales.
In contrast, environmental benets are very small as the average fuel economy of purchased
new cars improves only little. Consequently, the main impact of scrapping schemes is on the
total sales. There is no evidence for crowding out through the substitution e¤ect between
eligible and non-eligible cars during the targeted schemes, although we nd some evidence
for small intertemporal substitution e¤ects.24
24Our considerable sales impact of the scrapping schemes seems to be in line with the recent estimates of
the sales e¤ect of scrapping schemes introduced in response to the nancial crisis, found in other studies.
For instance, Mian and Su (2012) nd that about half of the vehicles that were purchased under the US
CARS Program were such that would otherwise not have been purchased. The US studies nd however
higher intertemporal e¤ects, which makes the overall performance of the program rather bleak. The car
sales decreased in the months before and especially after the program (Copeland and Kahn (2012), Mian
and Su (2012), Li et al. (2013)). There is also some evidence on the sales e¤ects of scrapping schemes
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Competitive and trade e¤ects We now extend the framework to consider the competi-
tive e¤ects of the scrapping schemes, i.e. the di¤erential impact of scrapping schemes between
domestic and foreign car producers, between premium and volume brands, and between the
various market segments. As discussed above, we limit attention to the specication where
the scrapping scheme is measured as a percentage subsidy.
Table 5 reports the results. Column (1) follows specication (5), and considers whether
scrapping programs have a di¤erent sales e¤ect on domestic and foreign rms. This enables us
to assess whether the scrapping schemes are designed to support domestic car production,
especially so-called national champions. Interestingly, the non-targeted schemes have a
stronger impact on domestic than on foreign brands: a 1 percent non-targeted subsidy raises
sales of foreign brands by 1.2%, and it raises the sales of domestic brands by an additional
1.5%. Hence, the non-targeted schemes (introduced in important car-producing countries
Germany and the United Kingdom) may still protect domestic manufacturers, even though
they were designed very broadly and without any restrictive eligibility conditions. This may
be due to some unobserved characteristics of the schemes.
in the past. For instance, Licandro and Sampayo (2005) quantify a transitory increase of 16% in car sales
following the introduction of 1997 Spanish scrapping subsidy and a permanent increase of about 1.2% in car
sales in the long run. Schiraldi (2011) nds that the Italian cash-for-replacementschemes increased sales
by 97% in 1997 and by 51% in 1998. Adda and Cooper (2000) also report the bursts in car sales following
the introduction of French scrapping subsidies in 1994 and 1996.
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Table 5: Competitive e¤ects of scrapping schemes: domestic versus foreign car brands,
premium versus volume cars








scrap_pct TX -0.656 -1.892
(-0.659) (-2.002)
(1  scrap) T 0.011 -0.004
(0.733) (-0.200)
(1  scrap) TX -0.078 0.043
(-0.893) (1.028)
# months (t) 84 84
# models 1,300 1,300
# countries 9 9
# groups (model/country e¤ects jc) 8,761 8,761
# observations 383,566 383,566
R-squared 0.269 0.269
The table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) for specication (5). The dependent
variable is the logarithm of car model sales. Car characteristics, country-specic model, country-specic monthly
(for seasonal adjustment), and year-monthly xed e¤ects as well as macroeconomic controls (income per capita,
unemployment, consumer condence, and fuel prices) and dummies (or respectively, relative size) for green
rebates in Belgium and France are included but not reported. Xstands for DOM(domestic brand dummy)
in (1), and for PREMIUM(premium brand dummy) in (2).
In contrast, the targeted schemes do not have a di¤erential impact on domestic and
foreign car brands. Hence, domestic brands do not receive any extra stimulus under targeted
schemes, but they may of course benet more if they are more likely to fall under the
eligibility criteria, set by the governments. To assess this, we computed the overall e¤ects
of targeted schemes on total domestic and foreign sales. The major car-producing countries
with targeted schemes are France, Italy and Spain. We nd that domestic rms do not
benet more than foreign rms.
In particular, our counterfactuals (Table 6) show that total sales of domestic cars would
have been 25.2% lower without non-targeted schemes, whereas total sales of foreign cars
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would have been only 13.6% lower. Therefore, non-targeted schemes have a larger stimulating
e¤ect on domestic car purchases. For instance, in the United Kingdom sales of domestic cars
would have been 20.4% lower absent the program, and only 12.2% lower for foreign cars.
In contrast, in the case of targeted schemes, sales of domestic cars would have been 14.4%
lower absent the schemes, and 17.0% lower for foreign cars. Therefore, both domestic and
foreign brands beneted from the targeted schemes. For instance, in France foreign brands
could have beneted only slightly more than domestic brands through scrapping incentives:
sales of domestic cars would have been 13.0% lower absent the subsidies, whereas sales of
foreign cars would have been 15.4% lower.
Table 6: Impact of removing scrapping schemes on domestic and foreign brands (2009)
Domestic brands Foreign brands
Country actual (million) % change actual (million) % change
Non-targeted schemes
Germany 2.10  25.97 1.52  19.61
Greece 0.21  0.83
Netherlands 0.42  3.91
UK 0.33  20.37 1.64  12.21
Total non-targeted 2.43  25.22 3.79  13.63
Total (Germany+UK) 2.43  25.22 3.16  15.78
Targeted schemes
France 1.19  12.99 1.00  15.42
Italy 0.46  17.13 1.20  16.66
Portugal 0.16  12.59
Spain 0.08  19.88 0.86  20.13
Total targeted 1.74  14.43 3.22  17.00
Eligible cars 1.63  19.83 2.42  22.02
Non-eligible cars 0.11  0.69 0.80  0.69
Total (France, Italy+Spain) 1.74  14.43 3.06  17.23
Total (excl. Belgium) 4.17  16.02 7.01  15.89
The table reports the actual total sales of domestic and foreign cars and the estimated changes in these vari-
ables due to scrapping schemes based on the counterfactuals for specication (5). The left hand side of the
table presents the ndings for domestic brands, while the right hand side of the table reports the ndings for
foreign brands. Countries with non-targeted schemes include Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, whereas countries with targeted schemes include France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Scrapping schemes can thus have adverse e¤ects on competition since they might benet
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domestic car producers, but only indirectly in the case of non-targeted schemes. The environ-
mental eligibility criteria in the case of targeted schemes, contrary to a priori expectations,
may however not involve any serious competitive concerns.25
Because of the di¤erential impact on domestic and foreign car sales, scrapping schemes
may exercise not only competitive e¤ects, but also a¤ect trade ows. The increased demand
for foreign car brands, not produced locally, or the increased demand for domestic car brands
that cannot be satised based on the existing countrys capacities, can have an e¤ect on
trade ows. For instance, they may stimulate higher imports to meet the countrys internal
demand, and/or increase exports to meet the increased demand abroad. There is some
evidence that car imports increased into Germany during the 2009 scrapping scheme because
most small and economical cars are either produced by foreign car producers, or they are
not manufactured in Germany (IHS Global Insight (2010b)). Especially Korean, French and
Italian car makers could prot from this trend.26
Column (2) of Table 5 follows a variant of specication (5), and considers whether the
scrapping programs have a di¤erent e¤ect on volume and premium producers. We nd evi-
dence for a lower stimulus e¤ect on premium cars in the case of targeted scrapping programs:
a 1 percent targeted subsidy raises demand by 2.9% for volume brands and by only 1.0% for
premium brands. Since there are no environmental eligibility conditions in the case of non-
targeted schemes (these conditions could target in particular smaller and more fuel-e¢ cient
cars that usually volume car manufacturers produce), both premium and volume brands can
prot from the scrapping subsidies. Recall that our premium brand denition includes Audi,
BMW, Mercedes and some small luxury car brands (for instance, Bentley, Cadillac). Audi,
BMW and Mercedes are distinguished German premium car brands, and the German scheme
was designed very broadly, most probably so that these premium car producers could have
a chance to benet from the scheme as well. Our counterfactuals also conrm that both
premium and volume car brands beneted from the scrapping subsidies, however premium
brands proted to a much lower extent.
Finally, we investigate the e¤ects of scrapping schemes on sales across market segments.
As we can see in Table 7, subcompact and compact cars beneted both in the case of
25This is also conrmed in the case of the US CARS targeted Program: Japanese car producers Toyota,
Honda and Nissan proted disproportionately more from the program than other car producers. This might
be related to the fact that Japanese cars are more fuel-e¢ cient than US cars (Li et al. (2013)). Furthermore,
it may also be attributed to the bankruptcy proceedings or restructuring processes that US domestic car
producers were involved into in the summer of 2009 (Cooper et al. (2010)). The nancial troubles could have
increased the reluctance of US consumers to buy cars from the ailing domestic producers due to after-sales
service concerns (see for instance, Hortaçsu et al. (2010)).
26In the US, half of the incremental car demand due to the 2009 CARS Program was satised by non-North
American as well as Canadian and Mexican imports (Cooper et al. (2010)).
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targeted and non-targeted schemes. There is no e¤ect on the sales of cars belonging to the
intermediate market segment. Standard, luxury and sports cars benet only in the case
of targeted schemes, while SUVs might benet only in the case of non-targeted schemes.
Compact vans and MPVs prot also in the case of both targeted and non-targeted schemes,
but the e¤ect under the targeted programs is larger. Most probably, large cars can still
prot from the targeted schemes if they meet the program eligibility criteria, despite a price
disadvantage compared to small lower-priced cars.
Table 7: Competitive e¤ects of scrapping schemes: market segments
subcompact compact intermediate standard luxury van MPV SUV sports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
scrap  NT 1.365 1.526 -0.719 -0.331 -0.670 0.759 1.536 0.916 -0.395
(5.945) (3.770) (-1.339) (-0.429) (-0.821) (1.597) (1.779) (1.775) (-0.629)
scrap  T 1.558 1.819 1.843 5.100 5.685 2.440 5.855 -0.177 3.313
(5.562) (3.748) (1.353) (2.915) (1.633) (3.128) (4.728) (-0.056) (2.099)
(1  scrap) T -0.011 0.006 -0.047 0.063 0.063 -0.094 0.053 0.060 0.056
(-0.161) (0.118) (-1.033) (1.264) (2.326) (-1.678) (0.980) (1.834) (2.434)
# months (t) 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
# models 198 205 126 94 108 88 58 189 234
# countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
# groups 1,307 1,308 894 662 703 661 386 1,264 1,576
(model/country e¤ects jc)
# observations 65,029 59,932 41,981 24,634 31,541 29,779 18,259 55,662 56,749
R-squared 0.214 0.273 0.338 0.385 0.336 0.340 0.398 0.313 0.321
The table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) for various market segments (based
on the relative incentive). The dependent variable is the logarithm of car model sales. Car characteristics,
country-specic model, country-specic monthly (for seasonal adjustment), and year-monthly xed e¤ects as
well as macroeconomic controls (income per capita, unemployment, consumer condence, and fuel prices) and
dummies (or respectively, relative size) for green rebates in Belgium and France are included but not reported.
5 Conclusion
The last nancial and economic crisis has been accompanied by the worsening of consumer
condence and degradation of householdsaccess to nance. In addition, there was uncer-
tainty about future economic prospects. These factors led to a short-term decline in the
demand for cars. To stimulate new car purchases, a number of European countries have in-
troduced scrapping programs. In our study we have investigated the impact of the scrapping
schemes that were adopted during the recent economic crisis. In particular, we studied the
incentive e¤ects of the scrapping schemes, in terms of stimulating (or at least stabilizing)
total demand, and yielding environmental benets in the form of fuel economy savings for
new vehicles. We also studied the presence of any crowding out e¤ects of the scrapping
schemes, and their competitive and trade e¤ects.
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For our purpose, we have collected a unique model-level monthly dataset on the European
car market and scrapping schemes. We apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, with xed
e¤ects in a panel data context, and exploit variation of scrapping programs at country level to
identify the impact of scrapping programs on car sales. The country di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach is well-suited in our context: various European countries have introduced or phased
out their scrapping subsidies at di¤erent points in time, or some countries have not introduced
any scrapping scheme at all. This estimation strategy can help us to alleviate the potential
endogeneity problem that may be characteristic for time-series country-specic studies on
scrapping policy evaluation (i.e. both sales and scrapping schemes may be driven by some
third variable, e.g. worsening macroeconomic conditions).
As related to the incentive and crowding-out e¤ects, we found that scrapping schemes
have substantially stimulated car purchases. This prevented a large decline in sales in 2009
due to the last economic downturn. Targeted schemes had stronger e¤ects on car sales than
non-targeted schemes, especially on the sales of eligible cars. Targeted schemes did not cause
any substitution between di¤erent types of cars: eligible cars do not benet at the expense
of non-eligible cars. In contrast, the environmental benets of the scrapping schemes were
very modest, in the sense that they improved the average fuel economy of new cars to a
low extent. In sum, the scrapping schemes that were introduced in response to the crisis
can be viewed as a short-term instrument to stabilize car demand and thus to counteract
the nancial crisis and economic downturn, but not as a long-term instrument to generate
environmental benets.27
As related to competitive and trade e¤ects, we found that the greeneligibility criteria
in the case of targeted schemes (e.g. in the form of CO2 emissions) did not cause any serious
competitive bias. Although the primary objective of these criteria may be to protect na-
tional champions, foreign competitors could benet from the schemes as well, and domestic
cars did not gain more than foreign brands. In contrast, non-targeted schemes stimulated
higher purchases of domestic car brands. Furthermore, premium car brands still gained from
the targeted scrapping subsidies, although to a lesser extent than volume brands. They did
no face any extra disadvantage from being a premium brand in the case of non-targeted
schemes. Consumers can still buy premium cars if they are attractive to them because of a
price advantage due to the xed scrapping premium. Finally, scrapping subsidies had dif-
27We cannot empirically quantify the trade-o¤s, if there exist any, between economic and environmental
targets of scrapping programs in the sense, discussed by Li and Wei (2013) for the US CARS Program. The
authors argue that environmental benets are the costs of economic stimulus, in the sense that the sales
e¤ects would have been larger in the absence of any program eligibility criteria. Li et al. (2013) doubt both
the environmental impact of the program due to the high implied costs of reducing gasoline consumption
and CO2 emissions and the possibility to reach multiple objectives with a single policy.
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ferent sales e¤ects across market segments, and not only small but also large cars beneted
from the scrapping programs.
In general, our empirical analysis and ndings t well into the economic framework
that we have implemented to assess scrapping subsidies, following the so called balancing
test of positive and negative e¤ects applied by the European Commission in the case of
state aid. In European state aid terms, scrapping schemes are a public support instrument
that does not constitute state aid if the schemes are non-discriminatory, i.e. open to all
undertakings or fall under the de minimis regulation. Hence, they are not subject to the
notication requirement and the economic assessment by the European Commission. Our
ndings generally support, contrary to a priori expectations, the presumed ex ante non-
discriminatory nature of scrapping schemes. Our ex post evaluation of European scrapping
schemes in the nancial crisis has been very informative in this respect, and the Commission
can pursue such evaluations in the future to guide its public support policy.
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A Appendix
Figure 2: Car sales in selected European countries (monthly, seasonally adjusted)
The gure depicts seasonally adjusted monthly car sales in several European countries: France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Duration of the crisis scheme in France: 1
Jan 2009-31 Dec 2010. Duration of the scheme in Germany: 14 Jan 2009-31 Dec 2009. Duration of
the scheme in the Netherlands: 29 May 2009-21 Apr 2010. Duration of the scheme in the United
Kingdom: 18 May 2009-31 Mar 2010. The o¢ cial duration of a scheme is given.
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